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Abstract—In the literature, Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG)
double-sided auctions have been applied to inter-domain traffic
exchange because they provide incentives to be truthful and
lead to an efficient use of the network, among relevant proper-
ties of mechanism design. Unfortunately, the resulting resource
allocation scheme is neither budget-balanced nor solvable in
a decentralized way, two important properties. We present a
different but more realistic auction-based algorithm for allocating
bandwidth over paths to end users or ISPs, leading to a
new budget-balanced pricing scheme for which allocations and
charges can be computed in a decentralized way.
I. INTRODUCTION
In communication networks, there are several mechanism
design-based approaches to allocate network bandwidth over
time [1]. Pricing-based mechanisms have especially been
considered as a relevant way to provide incentives to agents
involved in networking games to act “properly”. Several papers
have been devoted to the study of such situations [2], [3], [4],
[5], [6]. We consider here inter-domain resource allocation
problem where the network is made of Autonomous Systems
(AS)es trying to deliver their traffic by routes going through
independent ASes which have to be “rewarded”. Inter-domain
allocation problem was first introduced in the context of
mechanism design in [7], [4]. The authors formulated incentive
inter-domain routing as a mechanism design problem using
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions. Most works on pric-
ing and resource allocation have followed up their proposition
[8], [9], [10], [6], [11], [12] since VCG is the only mechanism
[13] which provides a general way of constructing a dominant-
strategy, incentive-compatible, individually rational, and effi-
cient mechanism. However, it is often neglected in those works
that VCG auction mechanisms for multiple heterogenous items
may not be computationally tractable and budget-balanced
[14], [15]. Combinatorial double-sided auctions on the other
hand have been studied by R. Jain and J. Walrand [6], [16]
but in centralized control. Our pricing mechanism is inspired
by those works but is different in several significant aspects.
In our paper, we formulate the inter-domain allocation
problem in which the players are both buyers and sellers at
the same time. Our main contribution is though to propose a
new pricing rule such that all allocations and prices can be
computed in a decentralized way, a key criterion for large
networks often neglected in the literature. We look for an
algorithm that is BGP-compatible such that each AS negotiates
only with its neighbors. We then illustrate numerically the
impact of this scheme on the inter-domain pricing game and
compare it with the previous propositions.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections II presents
a combinatorial double-sided auctions mathematical model
applied to inter-domain. In Section III, we describe a forward
and backward induction algorithm to find the globally optimal
solution while allowing each agent to execute our algorithm
asynchronously. Section IV illustrates the power of our algo-
rithm thanks to simulations, as well as the convergence of the
pricing game to an ǫ−Nash equilibrium. The comparison of
efficiency (in terms of social welfare) and incentive compati-
bility obtained with VCG auctions and combinatorial double-
sided auctions is also provided. Finally, Section V concludes
the paper with a brief discussion of future work.
II. INTER-DOMAIN RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
MODELING
The communication network is modeled as a graph G =
(V,L). There are n nodes in V , corresponding to the n agents,
and links in L are the links between ASes. We assume that
there is no capacity constraint. There is a set R of routes.
Each route r ∈ R is defined as an ordered list of nodes, each
node appearing only once, and such that for two successive
nodes in the list there exists a link ℓ ∈ L between those two
nodes. Define also for node v ∈ V , RS(v) the subset of routes
starting at v and RD(v) the subset of routes ending at v.
Each provider v places buy-bids on a set of routes Rv (note
that routes are here initiated from v, but this can be extended
without difficulty). For each route r ∈ Rv , the bid is made of
the maximum per unit price cˆIv(r) AS v is willing to pay and
the maximum amount yˆr he is willing to get. He additionally
places sell-bids (cˆTv (r), xˆ
T
v (r)) for routes r AS v is on, where
cˆTv (r) is the minimum unit price he wants to sell resource and
xˆTv (r) the maximum amount he agrees to sell. Define R
i
v this
set of route going through v but not initiated from v, that is
the routes where v has to transfer traffic.
The auctioneer designer seeks to determine allocations yr
on routes r as the solution of the following linear optimization
problem
max
y
∑
v
∑
r∈Rv
cˆIv(r)yr −
∑
v
∑
r∈Riv
cˆTv (r)x
T
v (r) (1)
such that
0 ≤ yr ≤ yˆr ,∀r (2)
yr ≤ xˆ
T
v (r) ∀v,∀r ∈ R
i
v (3)
xT = Ay ≤ xˆT , (4)
where
A = (Avr)v,r with Avr = 1 of v ∈ r, 0 otherwise
y = (yr)r
xT =
(∑
r
xTv (r)
)
v
.
The first constraint (2) says that the allocation flow should
be matched with buyer’s maximum demand yˆr and only non-
negative allocations are allowed. The second constraint (3)
means that at each node v the incoming traffic flow on each
route r should not exceed the amount of traffic v is willing to
sell. The third constraint says that total flow allocation xTv to
seller v should equal the sum of flows on the routes through
v.
Our new mechanism comes for the remark that (1) can
hardly be solved in a decentralized way [15]. For this reason,
we alternatively apply a modified double-sided auction. We
consider routes r independently (thanks to the assumption
about no capacity constraint, a relevant assumption in core
networks) , and therefore a single buyer with multiple sellers
corresponding to intermediate nodes on the route. We will say
that an allocation r∗ is efficient for a source provider if it is
a solution of the optimization problem
arg max
r∈RS
i
,yr≥0
cˆIi (r)yr −
∑
∀r∈RS
i
∑
j 6=i
cˆTj (r)x
T
j (r) (5)
such that
0 ≤ yr ≤ yˆr (6)
xTj (r) ≤ xˆ
T
j (r) ∀j ∈ r (7)
xTj (r)Ajr = yr ∀j,∀r ∈ R
S
i . (8)
In Equation (5), (cˆIi (r), yˆr) denotes the buy-bid from source
provider i on route r, (cˆTj (r), xˆ
T
j (r)) denotes the sell-bids
from intermediate nodes along route r. The allocation yr is
chosen in a way that each buyer’s bid will be matched up
with his maximum demand yˆr and seller’s bid will be matched
within their maximum supply xˆTj (r). In this optimization, the
allocation is determined for a route or a set of routes for
a single source-destination pair. The constraints have similar
meaning as in the global optimization in (1) except for the last
one saying that the actual flow should be the same on each
intermediate nodes along route r.
The settlement price is called the reserved price and is
determined at each intermediate node. It is the ask-price of
the matched seller which provides the corresponding route r∗
to destination. Notice that if the solution of the optimization
at each intermediate node is a set of routes (r)∗ from multiple
sellers, the reserved price at this stage is the highest ask-price
among matched sellers and the declared cost of an intermediate
node will be made of its own declared cost plus the reserved
price from himself to destination in the backward induction
process, see Equation (10) later on. The source provider’s
payment is finally determined as the total reserved prices at
each backward stage, which is included in the cost of the
matched neighbors of the source node, being
ρ¯r∗ = max(cˆ
T
j (r
∗)),∀j ∈ NDi . (9)
Using surplus maximization in each allocation stage, the
individual buyer can satisfy its demand with the lowest cost
while pricing mechanism remains incentive-compatible for all
sellers (recalling that they are neighbors of the buyer) but the
matched seller with the highest ask-price. The theoretical and
numerical analysis on the incentive-compatible property will
be given in the sections III and IV. The difference between
our proposed payment scheme and [16] is that our payment
rule determined step-by-step at each stage of the backward
induction. The source provider’s payment is the cost of its
matched neighbors, and it includes all reserved cost of the
remaining nodes. In [16], the payment rule is determined at
the end of the allocation process: the source provider pays
each intermediate node the highest ask-price among matched
sellers. As a result, the settlement price in [16] is always more
than or equal to the settlement price at each allocation stage,
leading to the higher revenues for the sellers than our proposed
pricing scheme. For this reason, the social welfare1 in our
proposed pricing scheme is relaxed as compare to the social
welfare in centralized combinatorial double-sided auction in
[16]. The simulation results in the next section will show the
social welfare comparison of different pricing schemes.
III. FORWARD AND BACKWARD INDUCTION ALGORITHMS
We now propose a distributed algorithm to find the solution
of (5). The algorithm is made of sequential stages between
neighbor nodes in order to exchange bidding information. The
ASes send messages to each of their neighbors; the source
node initiates the allocation process and then other neighbor
nodes relay the message according to the following steps. The
forward induction is described in Algorithm 1, where the goal
is to determine a set of possible paths (RSsrc) to destination.
More precisely:
• The source node initiates the request messages including
its maximum demand yˆr for the route r, and sends to its
neighbor nodes. During the allocation process, each node
indeed communicates only to its neighbor nodes, i.e NDi
the set of neighbor nodes of node i.
• If a neighbor node j agrees to forward yˆr and the request
message has not previously been received, indicated by
visited(j) = false, it also initiates a request message
including its own maximum demand yˆr(r) to relay traffic
on route r, yˆr(j)
2 and propagates this request to its
1Aggregated utilities of the sellers
2yˆr(j) may be different from yˆr of the source node, depending on its own
demand traffic to destination on route r and its own maximum supplies.
neighbor nodes. Otherwise, it sends a reject message to
previous hop. The procedure is repeated until all request
messages reach the leaf nodes, which are nodes one-hop
away from the destination.
Algorithm 1 Building all possible paths to destination node
repeat
for all j ∈ NDi do
sending request (r, yˆr)
if visited(j) = false then
Add its maximum demand yˆr(j) to request messages
Forward request messages to its neighbors
Set visited(j) = true
else
Send reject message to previous hop
end if
end for
until j := destination
When this algorithm stops, we proceed backward on the
route started from leaf nodes, each leaf node k declares its
bid, (cˆTk , xˆ
T
k ), including it in ACK packets and sends it back
to previous hop. The second step of Algorithm 2 is to find a
flow (or maybe a set of flows) with minimal cost from neighbor
bids at each intermediate buyer j (i.e. argmin(cˆTk xˆ
T
k ),∀k ∈
NDj ). Each node announces its bid up on the tree. The price
an intermediate node announces is the price at which it was
reserved from its neighbor including its own transit price. If
rational, an intermediate node should propose a price at least
its reserved price as a transit price in order to have positive
payoff, i.e.,
cˆTk = c¯
T
k + ρ¯k, (10)
where ρ¯k is its reserved price for its neighbors and c¯
T
k (r) is its
transit price. Backward induction process is then repeated until
it reaches back the source node. Figure 1 illustrates how the
message passes through intermediate nodes. In our proposed
algorithm, each node plays both the seller and the buyer role
at the same time.
Proposition 1: The backward induction process yields the
minimal cost among possible routes at each intermediate node.
Proof: For each intermediate node j on route r ∈ RSj ,
the chosen routes are based on local surplus maximization (5)
which we recall
(r)∗ = arg max
r∈RS
i
,yr≥0
cˆIj (r)yr −
∑
k 6=j
cˆTk (r)x
T
k (r) (11)
This problem is similar to minimizing the cost from preceding
neighbor nodes on the built tree
(r)∗ = argmin
∑
k∈ND
j
cˆTk x
T
k (r) (12)
s.t
∑
k∈(r)∗
xTk ≥ yˆr(j).
Algorithm 2 Finding the corresponding routes to destination
backward on each intermediate node
repeat
for all j ∈ Ti do
if j is next hop to destination then
Attach its bid,(cˆTj , xˆ
T
j ), to ACK
Send ACK back to previous hop of j
else
Find (r)∗ = argmin(cˆTk xˆ
T
k ),∀k ∈ N
D
j
Subject to
∑
k∈ND
j
xˆTk ≥ yˆr(j)
Attach its bid,(cˆTj , xˆ
T
j ), to update messages of BGP
protocol
Send ACK back to previous hop of j
end if
end for
until j := i;
Fig. 1. Forward & backward induction illustration
Proposition 2: For given declared costs, our algorithm pro-
vides a decentralized solution of the surplus maximization (5).
Proof: With (r)∗ as the set of solution routes of the
optimization following (5):
arg max
r∈RS
i
,yr≥0s
cˆIi (r)yr −
∑
∀r∈(r)∗
∑
∀j∈r
cˆTj (r)x
T
j (r). (13)
In algorithm 2, the source node chooses a route with minimal
cost or a set of such routes if demand is not fully met.
Moreover, in Proposition 1, we have proved that each feedback
route is formed by the route with minimal cost. As a result,
we have
r∗ = argmin
∑
∀r
∑
∀j∈r
cˆTj (r)x
T
j (r) (14)
is the minimal aggregated valuation cost on intermediate
nodes, providing the maximal value in (5).
Remark that this maximization property is in terms of the
declared costs. Though, as we will see, since players’ best
interest is not to bid truthfully, efficiency property will not
be satisfied at the equilibrium point of the game on declared
costs.
Proposition 3: The allocation outcome satisfies individual
rationality.
Proof: The reserved price at each stage of an intermediate
node is the highest ask-price among its matched sellers, which
is ρ¯i = max(cˆ
T
j ),∀i ∈ r
∗,∀j ∈ NDi . Each intermediate
node should pay the highest ask-price from its preceding
neighbor and then receives a payment from its succeeding
neighbors. Thus, the matched sellers never receive a payment
less than their declared cost, leading to a non-negative payoff.
The unmatched sellers get nothing, thus our algorithm verifies
individual rationality.
Proposition 4: The mechanism is incentive-compatible ex-
cept for the highest matched seller at each stage of backward
algorithm in allocation process, assuming that each player has
no information about others and is risk-averse.
Proof: At each stage of the allocation process, an un-
matched seller has no incentive to bid lower than his reser-
vation cost because it leads to a negative utility. If he bids
higher, he cannot change its settlement price but may end up
getting unmatched. Thus, the best interest for them is to bid
truthfully. The matched seller has no incentive to bid higher
than its reservation cost because his action may end up getting
unmatched (by increasing its valuation cost in optimization)
due to the lack of information about competitors, which is
not approved by the risk-averseness assumption. Thus, at
each stage of allocation process when a intermediate node
negotiates with its neighbors, it is incentive-compatible for all
sellers except for the matched seller with the highest ask-price.
The mechanism remains fairly incentive compatible which
means the pricing mechanism are not fully satisfied truthful
bidding to all agents involved in the game, similarly to the
centralized algorithm provided in [16]. The further analysis on
the incentive compatibility property which is described as the
degree of manipulation (the amount of deviation from truthful
bidding) compared to VCG auctions will be given later.
IV. ALGORITHM ANALYSIS
In this section, we first illustrate numerically our resource
allocation algorithm for a random, single pair of nodes.
We then investigate the behavior of nodes reacting to our
allocation and pricing scheme when they can change their
strategies periodically.
A. Numerical illustration
We consider the simple topology with the real cost of transit
traffic under each node described in Figure 2. We assume
that the source node starts the forward induction process by
sending out its maximum demand, yˆr = 5 to its neighbor ASes
1 & 2. An intermediate node receives the request message
and forwards it to its own neighbors including the maximum
demand from source node. The bidding information can be
sent thanks to update messages in the BGP protocol. When the
request messages are forwarded to leaf nodes, which are ASes
3, 4, and 5, it ends the forward induction process because leaf
nodes could transfer directly traffic flow to destination node.
The result is a set of possible routes RSsrc to destination node
which is simply illustrated in Figure 3.
Fig. 2. A simple topology
During the backward induction process, leaf nodes submit
their sell bids backward along the path as depicted in Figure
4 including the maximal prices per unit they are willing to
sell and their maximal bandwidth supplies. After deciding the
corresponding route to destination, each intermediate node
declares its own bid backward to the source node which is
described as follows:
• Node 1 receives one bid from leaf node 5, (xˆT5 , cˆ
T
5 ) =
(5, 2), and the corresponding route to destination node
through AS 5 has a total cost of 10, being the amount
times price per unit traffic. The highest ask-price for
matched sellers is 2 per unit traffic because there is
only one matched seller at this stage. In order to have a
positive net payoff, we assume that it submits its own bid
(xˆT1 , cˆ
T
1 ) = (5, 3) which includes the price ρ¯1 reserved
for its neighbor AS-5 plus its own transit price c¯T1 , and
then sends it back to the source node.
• Node 2 receives two bids from its neighbors which are
(xˆT4 , cˆ
T
4 ) = (3, 2) and (xˆ
T
3 , cˆ
T
3 ) = (2, 3). Thus, it should
allocate corresponding routes from both ASes 3 and 4 due
to their limited bandwidth supplies. The matched sellers
are both ASes 3 and 4 with the highest ask-price of 3 per
unit traffic leading to the total route cost of 15. Similarly,
it submits its bid (xˆT2 , cˆ
T
2 ) = (5, 4) and then sends it back
to the source node.
• Source node receives two bids from ASes 1 and 2, which
are (xˆT1 , cˆ
T
1 ) = (5, 4) and (xˆ
T
2 , cˆ
T
2 ) = (5, 3) respectively.
The shortest cost route is the one from AS 1 having total
cost of 15 and the highest ask-price from this matched
seller is 3 per unit traffic. As a result, the route r∗ is
allocated through ASes 1 and 5. The payment imposed
on source node by AS 1 is 3 per unit traffic and afterwards
AS 1 should pay 2 per unit traffic to AS 5. It ends our
algorithm.
Remark that our mechanism is strongly budget-balanced.
Also the chosen route on each intermediate node is the one
providing the minimal cost from feedback information of its
neighbors. If AS 1 increases its own transit cost to 5 per traffic
unit, the allocated routes would change to AS 2 because we
Fig. 3. Forward induction
Fig. 4. Backward induction
would have xˆT2 cˆ
T
2 < xˆ
T
1 cˆ
T
1 . In that case, the result allocation
(r)
∗
would be to use multiple routes {(2, 3), (2, 4)}. The
settlement price imposed on source node by node 2 would
be 4 per traffic unit and on node 2 by leaf nodes 3 and 4 it
would be 3 per traffic unit.
In comparison with the centralized version in [16], the
allocated routes are the same than with our algorithm but
the settlement price imposed on source node is the highest
ask-price from matched sellers which is 2 per traffic unit for
both ASes 1 and 5, i.e., a different value. In case of a single
allocated route from source to destination, an intermediate
node receives as a payment exactly what he has bid.
B. Game on declared costs
We wish now to investigate numerically how ASes can play
with their declared costs when they can change their bids over
time instead of having a one-shot game, in order to improve
their revenue. We consider the same network topology than
in Section IV-A where the true reservation costs of nodes are
randomly taken from a uniform distribution over the integer
set {2, . . . , 8}, while the initial declared cost are also randomly
chosen, by adding a random cost uniformly chosen in {0, 1, 2}
to their true cost. Assuming the bid process is played round by
round, the nodes restart the allocation process after each round
and update their declared transit cost (always taken larger than
or equal to their true cost to ensure a non-negative revenue)
based on previous history. To summarize the behavior, the
matched sellers increase by a small amount their current
declared cost to try to increase their revenue during next round,
while the unmatched sellers decrease their current declared
cost, if possible, to try to get matched by the mechanism
during next round. The amount added or subtracted at each
round is randomly and uniformly taken within the set [0, 0.5].
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Fig. 5. Payoff of nodes over allocation process through a single route
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Fig. 6. Payoff of nodes over allocation process through multiple routes
Figures 5 and 6 display the payoffs of the different nodes
during the simulation. The results illustrate a convergence to a
periodic behavior. This oscillatory behavior is due to the fact
that, starting from round 6 in the allocation process illustrated
in Figure 5, the matched sellers get unmatched next round if
they increase by a small amount their declared cost. For the
unmatched sellers, their best strategies are to bid close to their
true reservation cost to become selected, and whenever they
try to increase their utilities, they get unmatched next round
again. In order to avoid such oscillations, the network manager
can impose a bid fee ǫ > 0 for changing costs after a given
number of rounds, bid sufficiently high that no one has an
interest in deviating from its current bid. Another option is to
fix the number of rounds to a finite value unknown from the
ASes, so that they cannot play strategically in terms of it. For
example, if we chose a bid fee ǫ defined as the maximal gain
of nodes from previous oscillation ǫ = max(uosc)−min(uosc)
yr
3
since round 10 of allocation process, we have found a so-called
ǫ−Nash equilibrium which is illustrated in Figure 7, where an
ǫ-Nash equilibrium is a bid profile such that no player can
improve his utility by more than ǫ.
3A bid fee ǫ is chosen as the maximal gain of nodes from previous
oscillation, where uosc is the net pay-off during oscillation.
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Fig. 7. ǫ−Nash equilibrium
We can remark in this game that ASes declare costs larger
than the true cost. It illustrates the difference with VCG auc-
tions described in [4], [8], where it is a dominant strategy for
nodes to bid truthfully. We illustrate in Figure 8 the impact of
untruthful bidding by displaying the cumulative distribution of
social welfare for our proposed pricing scheme, VCG auctions
and the combinatorial double-sided auctions[16], given the
random true cost choices. The social welfare is also taken with
our proposed pricing algorithm at the ǫ−Nash equilibrium.
It shows that even at ǫ−Nash equilibrium, the efficiency is
relaxed too, as compared with the combinatorial double-sided
auction and VCG auctions, but not to a large extent.
Nodes True reservation cost Average deviation from truthful bidding
1 7 16%
2 7 1.5%
3 3 14%
4 6 5%
5 4 18%
TABLE I
AVERAGE DEVIATION FROM TRUTHFUL BIDDING.
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Fig. 8. Empirical cumulative distribution of the social welfare.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a BGP-compatible, decen-
tralized resource allocation algorithm based on double-sided
auction. To have a decentralized and strongly budget-balanced
allocation pricing scheme, two key properties, we have relaxed
efficiency and incentive compatibility properties as compared
to VCG auctions [4], [8] and combinatorial double-sided
auctions [16]. We give some simulation results and illustrate
that the system outcome reaches an ǫ−Nash equilibrium in
a finite number of rounds if we charge a bid fee ǫ for any
change of declared cost. This outcome is illustrated to be a
good trade-off between complexity and efficiency.
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